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Voters' Rights Act of 1965 as amended 
in 1982. The Act in part states that, 
[a] violation ... is established 
if, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, it is shown that 
the political processes leading 
to nomination or election in 
the State or political subdivi-
sion are not equally open to 
participation by members of a 
class of citizens ... in that its 
members have less opportu-
nity than other members of 
the electorate to participate in 
the political process and to 
elect 'representatives' of their 
choice. 
Chisom, 111 S. Ct. at 2364 (quoting 
Voters' Rights Act of 1965, §2(b), as 
amended, 42 U .S.C.A. 1973). 
The Court then reviewed LULA C 
and rejected the respondent's claim 
that Congress' use of the word" repre-
sentatives" in Section 2(b) of the Vot-
ers' Rights Act was evidence of con-
gressional intent to exclude judicial 
elections from coverage. [d. at 2364. 
The Court noted the LULAC court's 
distinction of Section 2(b) providing 
two separate protections of minority 
voting rights. [d. 
The Court reasoned that the LULA C 
majority created two tests. One test 
was to be applied when the right of 
individuals to participate in the politi-
cal process was frustrated, such as by 
time and location disincentives that 
result in depriving a class of people of 
the opportunity to vote. [d. at 2365. 
The second part of the LULAC Sec-
tion 2(b) test involved the denial of the 
voters' "opportunity to elect repre-
sentatives of their choice. " [d. at 2364 
(quoting LULAC, 914 F.2d at 625.) 
In rejecting the dual reading of 
Section 2(b), the Court reasoned that 
to substitute the word "or" for the 
word " and" in interpreting Section 2 
would destroy the plain meaning of 
the sentence. [d. at 2365. The Court 
determined that such a radical recon-
struction would be necessary to sepa-
rate the opportunity to participate in 
the political process from the opportu-
nity to elect representatives. [d. 
The Court referred to its analysis 
in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 
(1973) and Whitcombv. Chavis, 403 
U.S. 124 (1971) in identifying the 
language from which Section 2 is 
patterned. Chisom, 110 S. Ct. at 
2365. In both of these cases, the Court 
found the opportunity to participate in 
the political process inextricably con-
nected to the opportunity to elect rep-
resentatives. [d. 
The Court opined that further sup-
port for their interpretation of "repre-
sentatives" as including judicial elec-
tions was evidenced by Congress' 
replacing the word " legislators" with 
" representatives" when adopting the 
language of the Court in White v. 
Regester. Chisom, 110S. Ct. at 2366. 
The Court reasoned that the substitu-
Chisom is also important as it repre-
sents the Court's continuation of the 
liberal application of the test for find-
ing a violation of the Voters' Rights 
Act of 1965. 
- Daryl D. Jones 
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine: 
ABSENT MATERIAL CHANGE IN 
STATEMENT'S MEANING, DE-
LIBERATE ALTERATION OF 
SPEAKER'S WORDS BY AUTHOR 
NOT ACTUAL MALICE. 
In Masson v. New Yorker Maga-
zine, 111 S.Ct. 2419 (1991), the United 
States Supreme Court held that an 
author's alteration of a speaker's state-
ments did not amount to actual malice 
for defamation purposes unless such 
an alteration resulted in a material 
tion of" representatives" for" legisla- change in the statement's meaning. 
tors" indicates that Congress intended Thus, the Court rejected the argument 
the phrase to cover more than legisla- that any alteration of a speaker's words 
tive elections. [d. beyond those made for grammar or 
The Court next likened the inclu- syntax proved knowledge offalsity or 
sion of sheriffs, prosecutors, state reckless disregard for the truth. 
treasurers, and other elected officials Plaintiff, Jeffrey Masson, claimed 
chosen by popular elections as "repre- he was defamed by article author Janet 
sentatives" to judges who are chosen Malcolm when she used quotation 
by popular elections. [d. The Court marks to attribute to Masson com-
determined that the word" representa- ments he alleged he did not make. 
tive" refers to someone who prevails Malcolm interviewed Masson, a noted 
in a popular election, within which psychoanalyst and former Projects 
judicial elections exist. [d. Director of the Sigmund Freud Ar-
Lastly, the Court found their in- chives, for an article she was writing 
terpretation of Section 2 consistent about him for The New Yorker maga-
with the broad remedial purpose of zine. Prior to the publication of the 
ridding the country of racial discrimi- article, Masson expressed concern to 
nation in voting, upon which the Vot- the fact-checking department of the 
ers' Rights Act of 1965 was enacted. magazine about a number of errors in 
[d. at 2368. In applying the Voters' several passages. Despite these con-
Rights Act, the Court noted its policy cerns, the article appeared in the maga-
statement in Allen v. State Board of zine as a two-part series in 1983, and 
Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), pro- in 1984 Respondent, AlfredA. Knopf, 
viding that the Act should be broadly Inc., published the entire series as a 
read to combat discrimination. book. 
Chisom, 110 S. Ct. at 2368. 
The decision in Chisom is signifi-
cant as it disallows race based voter 
dilution or "gerrymandering" of elec-
toral districts in judicial elections 
through narrowly interpreting Section 
2 of the Voters' Rights Act of 1965. 
Masson brought a libel action 
against Malcolm, New Yorker Maga-
zine, and Alfred Knopf, Inc. under 
California libel law in the United 
States District Court for the Northern 
District of California. The parties 
agreed that Masson was a public fig-
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ure and as such, could sustain his 
action for defamation onl y ifhe proved 
the defendants acted with actual mal-
ice, that is with knowledge of falsity 
or reckless disregard for the truth. 
The trial court granted the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment, con-
cluding that the alleged alterations 
were" substantially true" or were" ra-
tional interpretations" of Malcolm's 
conversations with Masson. Thus, 
the court found that the passages did 
not rise to the level of actual malice as 
required by New York TImesv. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, 
and the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari, reversed and remanded. 
The Supreme Court began by re-
viewing the six passages Masson al-
1eged were defamatory. The Court 
found that while each of the six pas-
sages purported to quote Masson's 
statements to Malcolm, Masson made 
no such identical statements in any of 
the over 40 hours of taped interviews. 
Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2425-28. The 
Court then discussed the use of quota-
tion marks, and explained that gener-
ally quotation marks are used to at-
tribute to a speaker words spoken by 
him verbatim. Id. at 2430. Quotation 
marks further differentiate between 
those words directly from the speaker 
and those of the author. [d. 
Second, the Court explained that 
quotation marks can also be inter-
preted by a reader as non-literal or 
reconstructions of a speaker's state-
ment, so that the reader would not 
reasonably believe the quoted pas-
sages indicated reproductions of ac-
tual conversations. Id. at2430-31. In 
the instant case, however, the Court 
found that Malcolm gave no indica-
tions to the reader that the quoted 
statements were not the actual repro-
ductions of Masson's statements. Id. 
at 2431. The Court therefore found 
that a reasonable reader could, in fact, 
believe the quoted passages were the 
verbatim statements of Masson. Id. 
The Court next considered whether 
any alteration of a verbatim quotation 
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proved falsity for defamation liability. 
While the Court noted that in some 
sense any alteration of a quoted pas-
sage was false, the Court reasoned that 
grammar and syntax often necessitate 
such alterations. Id. 
The existence of both a speaker 
and a reporter; the translation 
between two media, speech 
and the printed word; the ad-
dition of punctuation; and the 
practical necessity to edit and 
make intelligible a speaker's 
perhaps rambling comments, 
all make it misleading to sug-
gest that a quotation will be 
reconstructed with complete 
accuracy. 
Id. at 2432. Thus, the Court refused to 
recognize that any alteration, includ-
ing a deliberate alteration, beyond 
those made for grammar and syntax 
proved falsity unless such alteration 
resulted in a material change in the 
meaning the statement conveyed. Id. 
at 2433. 
The Court next examined the issue 
of whether an altered quotation was 
protected so long as it was a " rational 
interpretation" of the speaker's actual 
statement. Id. The Court rejected the 
court of appeals' reasoning on this 
issue, finding no support in either the 
principles of defamation or First 
Amendment jurisprudence. Id. The 
Court explained that in this case, the 
use of quotations was to inform the 
reader of Masson 's statements, not the 
rational interpretations of such state-
ments by the author. Id. at 2434. The 
Court stated that adopting a rational 
interpretation standard "would give 
journalists the freedom to place state-
ments in their subjects' mouths with-
out fear of liability [and] would dimin-
ish to a great degree the trustworthi-
ness of the printed word, and elimi-
nate the real meaning of quotations." 
Id. 
In this case, the Court found that 
five of the six disputed passages did, 
in fact, differ materially in meaning 
from the tape-recorded statements so 
as to give rise to an issue of fact for a 
jury to decide regarding falsity. The 
Court held that absent a material change 
in the meaning of a speaker's state-
ments, a deliberately-altered quota-
tion will not subject the author to 
liability for defamation. 
Justice White, concurring in part 
and dissenting in part, disagreed with 
the majority's holding that a deliber-
ate alteration of a quotation did not 
rise to the level of falsity unless the 
alteration was a material change in the 
meaning of the statement. Id. at 2437. 
Justice White referred to New York 
TImes v. Sullivan, which held that any 
known falsehood was sufficient proof 
of malice. Id. at 2438. Justice White 
observed that" [t]he falsehood, appar-
ently, must be substantial; the re-
porter may lie a little, but not too 
much." Id. 
The court expanded the scope of 
protection for authors by allowing 
them to deliberately alter a speaker's 
words and then place those words in 
quotation marks. The Court in Masson 
stopped a bit' short and refused to 
widen that expansion to include al-
tered quotations which were rational 
interpretations of the speaker's state-
ments. Prior to this decision, a reader 
seeing quotation marks around a pas-
sage would have reasoned the quoted 
passage to be a verbatim duplication 
of the speaker's words. Now, the 
reader must beware: writers and 
journalists have the permission of the 
Supreme Court to alter a speaker's 
words and put that alteration in quota-
tion marks. 
- Ellen Poris 
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